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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, a number of important judicial decisions and
regulatory actions concerning oil and gas development occurred in
Colorado. These decisions and actions should be of interest to all persons who are involved in Colorado oil and gas activity.
II.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission v. Grand Valley
Citizens' Alliance, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the public's
right to request formal hearings before the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission ("Commission") on various matters, including applications for permits to drill ("APDs").' The case arose
out of a petition that several organizations and individuals filed with
the Commission seeking hearings on APDs for wells located approximately three miles from Project Rulison.2 Because Commission regulations do not authorize members of the public to request such
hearings, the petition was treated as a complaint, and no hearing was
1. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Grand Valley Citizens' Alliance,
279 P.3d 646 (Colo. 2012) (en banc).
2. Id. at 647-48. Project Rulison was the site of a 1969 underground nuclear
detonation, and the petitioners alleged that the APDs therefore raised issues of public
health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 647, 649.
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held.' After the Commission conditionally approved the APDs, the
petitioners filed a lawsuit in Denver District Court.' The district court
dismissed the lawsuit, but the court of appeals reversed.5 In a potentially sweeping decision, the court of appeals held that the Commission is statutorily required to hold a hearing in response to any
petition involving a matter within its jurisdiction, including APDs.6
The Colorado Supreme Court's review turned on its analysis of the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act ("Conservation Act").' The
court of appeals had based its decision upon section 108(7) of the
Conservation Act, which states that "[o]n the filing of a petition concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the [Clommission, it shall
promptly fix a date for a hearing thereon . . . ."8 The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, however, that this provision refers to a hearing on a rule, regulation, or order.9 The Court based this conclusion
upon other language in section 108, as well as other provisions of the
Conservation Act that specifically require hearings in certain circumstances or distinguish between rules, orders, and permits.' 0 The Court
further concluded that permits are governed by section 106(1)(f),
which grants the Commission broad authority to promulgate regulations governing permitting, including authority to specify who may request a hearing." Because Commission regulations do not authorize
members of the public to seek APD hearings, the Commission properly denied the petition at issue.' 2 The decision affirms the Commission's longstanding practices of defining by regulation who may
request hearings on matters not involving rules, regulations, and orders and not allowing members of the public to request hearings on
APDs. As the Court noted, members of the public may still voice
their concerns, but they must do so through the submittal of comments and complaints.'"
Another Colorado Supreme Court decision, Larson v. Sinclair
Transportation Co., addressed the use of eminent domain for petroleum pipelines.' 4 That case arose out of a transportation company's
condemnation of an easement across private property for the purpose
of constructing an underground gasoline pipeline.' The Weld County
3. Id. at 647.
4. Id.
5, Id.
6. Id. at 648.
7. Id. at 648-49; COLO. Ray. STAT. § 34-60-101 (2012).
8. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 279 P.3d at 648; COLO. REv.
§ 34-60-108(7) (2012).
9. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 279 P.3d at 648.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 649; COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(1)(f) (2012).
12. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 279 P.3d at 649.
13. Id.
14. Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co., 284 P.3d 42 (Colo. 2012) (en banc).
15. Id. at 43.
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District Court ruled that the company could condemn the property for
this purpose pursuant to a Colorado statute that grants such authority
to "telegraph, telephone, electric light power, gas, or pipeline compan[ies]."' 6 The court of appeals affirmed this ruling on the ground
that the condemning party was a "pipeline company" under the statute." But the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in a four to three
decision."8 It held that the statutory language does not encompass
pipelines that transport petroleum." Instead, the Court narrowly construed the term "pipeline company" to refer only to pipelines that deliver electric power, such as those encasing underground electric
wiring.2 0 In reaching this result, it noted that the statute does not refer to petroleum products and therefore does not expressly grant condemnation authority for pipelines conveying such substances. 2 1 The
Court also found that the statute does not implicitly convey such authority based on Colorado precedent that narrowly interprets condemnation statutes generally and on other statutory language and
legislative history that it read to indicate that the statute as a whole
concerns electric power infrastructure.2 Accordingly, it held that the
transportation company lacked authority to condemn the easement at
issue.
In Chase v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission, the Colorado court of appeals addressed the adequacy of the Commission's
administrative findings in a hearing on a split estate dispute. In that
case, the surface owners of an equestrian facility opposed oil and gas
development and requested that the Commission deem the facility a
Designated Outdoor Activity Area ("DOAA"), which would increase
the well setback requirements. 2 5 The Commission denied the surface
owners' request based on concerns that the facility did not fit within
the DOAA definition or regulation and that such a designation would
create waste.2 The Commission also denied on jurisdictional grounds
the surface owners' request that it interpret the mineral owner's lease,
and it approved the third-party lessee's APD for the property subject
to various conditions proposed by the surface owners.27 The Denver
District Court upheld the Commission's actions. 28 The court of ap16. Id.; CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-5-105 (2012).
17. Larson, 284 P.3d at 43.
18. Id. at 46.
19. Id. at 44-46.
20. Id. at 45.
21. Id. at 44, 46.
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id. at 46.
24. Chase v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 284 P.3d 161, 165 (Colo.
App. 2012).
25. Id. at 163.
26. Id. at 164.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 165.
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peals likewise upheld the Commission's determination that it lacked
jurisdiction to interpret the mineral lease.2 9 The court of appeals also
upheld the Commission's consideration of whether a DOAA designation would create waste because waste is specifically mentioned in the
Conservation Act."o But the court of appeals concluded that the
Commission's order did "not contain sufficient factual findings explaining why the [Commission] denied the DOAA."3 ' The court of
appeals therefore remanded the case so that the Commission could
prepare "detailed findings of facts, including assessments of the evidence and testimony, and conclusions of law" regarding its denial of
the DOAA.
Two decisions by the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado addressed analyses of future oil and gas development on
federal land under federal environmental and public land statutes. In
NaturalResources Defense Council v. Vilsack, the district court upheld
a Forest Service environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact for a project involving up to forty-five natural gas wells,
the construction of six well pads, and the creation of six miles of access road in Western Colorado." At the outset, the court found that
the plaintiff environmental organizations had adequately established
standing, explaining that even generalized harm, limited causation,
and minimal redressability are sufficient for this purpose.3 4 However,
the court held that the federal agencies had satisfied their environmental obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA")," National Forest Management Act, 6 and Federal Land
Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA").3 7 Although the Forest Service did not model or otherwise quantitatively analyze the project's
effect upon ozone because of the complexity and cost involved, the
court determined that the agency's decision not to do so was entitled
to deference and did not constitute arbitrary or capricious conduct.
The court also noted that the agency's analysis of ozone precursors did
not indicate a violation of applicable air quality standards, that its
analysis of visibility did not indicate a violation of Forest Plan require29. Id. at 167-68.
30. Id. at 170.
31. Id. at 171.
32. Id. at 171-72.
33. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Vilsack, No. 08-cv-02371-CMA, 2011 WL
3471011, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 5, 2011).
34. Id. at *3-6.
35. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335,
4341-4347 (2006).
36. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614, 472(a),
521(b) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
37. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1702,
1711-1723, 1731-1748, 1751-1753, 1761-1771, 1781-1782 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
38. Vilsack, 2011 WL 3471011, at *9.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/8
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ments, and that it had set forth a plan for addressing cumulative visibility issues."
In Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Salazar, the district court
found deficient a Bureau of Land Management ("Bureau") environmental impact statement for the Roan Plateau Planning Area, which
covers more than 120,000 acres in western Colorado. 40 The Bureau
had prepared the statement at issue for a new Resource Management
Plan, which was intended to coordinate public land management and
facilitate mineral leasing as directed by the 1997 Transfer Act.41 A
number of environmental organizations challenged the Bureau's actions under NEPA and FLPMA.4 2 The court upheld the Bureau's
elimination of a proposed alternative that would have prohibited most
leasing of land atop the Plateau because it did not comport with the
Transfer Act's leasing requirements and because most of its features
were included in other alternatives that were analyzed.4 3 The court
upheld the Bureau's justification of a twenty-year planning horizon
for assessing environmental effects on the ground that longer forecasts
would be speculative and unreliable.4 4 The court also upheld the Bureau's broad analysis of cumulative effects on elk and mule deer,
which essentially found that the effects from future drilling on private
land outside the planning area would be proportional to the effects
from future drilling on federal and private land within the planning

area. 4 5

The court concluded, however, that the Bureau's elimination of a
community-proposed alternative and its analyses of air quality effects
violated NEPA.' The court found that the community alternative
was a reasonable alternative that warranted consideration in the environmental impact statement because it was consistent with the purpose of the proposed action, it was distinct from the other alternatives,
and it was not treated as infeasible by the Bureau at the time of the
decision. 47 The court also found that the Bureau failed to take a hard
look at the cumulative air quality effects; the court noted that the Bureau had considered the air quality effects of future development on
federal and private land within the planning area, but it had neither
included the effects of future development on private land outside the
planning area nor adequately explained why such information could
39. Id. at *10-11.
40. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Salazar, No. 08-cv-01460-MSK-KLM, 2012 WL 2370067,
at *1, *20 (D. Colo. June 22, 2012).
41. Id. at *2; 10 U.S.C. § 7439 (2006).
42. Colo. Envtl. Coal., 2012 WL 2370067, at *5.
43. Id. at *8-10.
44. Id. at *11-13.
45. Id. at *14-15.
46. Id. at *10-11, *15-19.
47. Id. at *10-11.
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not be obtained. Similarly, the court ruled that the Bureau failed to
take a hard look at the potential ozone effects, either by conducting
ozone modeling, by assessing future levels of ozone precursors, or by
providing a more detailed explanation for its conclusions.4 9 The court
therefore set aside the decision embodied in the Resource Management Plan and remanded the matter to the Bureau, but the court did
not cancel the leases that the Bureau had issued.so
As in several other oil and gas producing states, plaintiffs have filed
lawsuits in Colorado alleging harm from hydraulic fracturing. In one
of these cases, Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp., the Denver District
Court issued a special case management order, known as a Lone Pine
order, and ultimately dismissed the case.s" Before full discovery or
other pretrial activities could proceed, the order required the plaintiffs
to make a prima facie showing of exposure, injury, and causation. 5 2
The court issued the order because of "the significant discovery and
cost burdens presented by a case of this nature" and because "ultimately [the plaintiffs] would need to come forward with this data and
expert opinions in order to establish their claims."' The court also
"relied on" an investigation by the Commission that determined that
the "[p]laintiffs' well water was not affected by oil and gas operations"
and on affidavits from defendants "that their activities were conducted in compliance with applicable laws and regulations."54
In response, the plaintiffs submitted some sampling data, letters
from a chemist stating equivocally that the sampling results could be
consistent with gas well contamination, and a toxicologist's affidavit
noting a temporal connection between the plaintiffs' injuries and the
defendants' activities and recommending that discovery proceed.5 5
The court found this insufficient to establish the prima facie elements
of the plaintiffs' case as required by the order:
all [plaintiffs' expert] conclusively opines on is that 'sufficient environmental and health information exists to merit further substantive
discovery.' Significantly, [plaintiffs' expert] makes no opinion as to
whether exposure was a contributing factor to [p]laintiffs' alleged
injuries or illness .... Plaintiffs' requested march towards discovery
without some adequate proof of causation of injury is precisely what
the [Lone Pine order] was meant to curtail."
48. Id. at *15-17.
49. Id. at *17-19.
50. Id. at *19.
51. Strudley v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 2011CV2218, 2012 WL 1932470, at 2, 4
(Colo. Dist. Ct. May 9, 2012). Lone Pine orders originated in the case of Lore v. Lone
Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1986).
52. Strudley, 2012 WL 1932470, at 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2-3.
56. Id. at 3.
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss2/8
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Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice, and the decision is currently on appeal.-"
Finally, two preemption cases are pending in the Colorado courts:
SG Interests I, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Gunnison
Countyss and Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. City
of Longmont.59 The Gunnison County case involves a lawsuit by an
owner and operator of oil and gas interests seeking to invalidate
county oil and gas regulations as preempted by amendments to the
Conservation Act and the Commission's implementing regulations.60
The challenged county regulations address a laundry list of issues, including well permitting, wildlife, water quality, water wells, cultural
and historic resources, geologic hazards, mitigation, access to records,
and financial guarantees.6 1 In September 2011, the court denied partial summary judgment on the owner and operator's claims for express
and implied preemption.6 2 The court concluded that state law and
regulations do not express a legislative intent to prohibit local land use
authority over oil and gas development. The court also found that
the state's interest in oil and gas activity is not so dominant as to impliedly preempt such local authority." In January 2012, the court determined that there is no operational preemption as a matter of law
and that an evidentiary hearing would be required to address the
issue.es
The City of Longmont case involves a lawsuit by the Commission
seeking to invalidate portions of the city's new oil and gas ordinance
as preempted by state law and regulations. 6 The challenged provisions prohibit surface facilities and operations in residential areas; address the use of multi-well pads and directional and horizontal drilling;
impose requirements regarding setbacks, wildlife habitat protection,
chemical reporting, visual mitigation, and water quality testing; and
set forth a process for resolving operational conflicts.6 Several of
these provisions directly or indirectly address hydraulic fracturing, in57. Id. at 4.
58. Complaint, SG Interests I, Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, No. 11CV127 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. June 2, 2011).
59. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v.
City of Longmont, No. 12CV702 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 30, 2012).
60. Complaint, supra note 58, at $$ 1, 3, 162.
61. Id. 1 103-61.
62. Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as it Relates to the
Fourth Claim for Relief and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative
Partial Summary Judgment at 5-6, SG Interests I, Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs,
No. 11CV127 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 2011).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Order of Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at 5-6, SG Interests I,
Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, No. 11CV127 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 3, 2012).
66. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 59, at Introduction & Prayer for
Relief.
42-116.
67. Id.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

7

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 19 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 8

306

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

cluding those regarding chemical reporting and water quality testing.
The Commission believes that all of these provisions involve "the regulation of oil and gas operations which, if countenanced, will undermine the Commission's statutory charge to foster the responsible
development of Colorado's oil and gas resources in a manner consistent with the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, including
protection of the environment and wildlife resources."6"
III.

REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

In August 2011, the Commission comprehensively amended Rule
318A-its Greater Wattenberg Area special well location, spacing,
and unit designation rule-which governs the location of wells in the
Greater Wattenberg Area north of Denver."9 The amendments became effective on September 30, 2011, for all of the area except the
City and County of Broomfield, and the Commission is expected to
extend the Rule 318A amendments to Broomfield during the summer
or fall of 2012.
Rule 318A generally authorizes the comingling of certain hydrocarbon resources; creates defined drilling locations; establishes procedures for adaptive spacing units; provides for the location of interior
infill and boundary wells; and limits the number of producing completions per quarter section.o The Commission amended these requirements to reduce the number of well-location exceptions associated
with the Niobrara Formation development and provide for additional
environmental reporting.7 ' Among other things, the amendments allow for smaller wellbore spacing units and for flexible horizontal
wellbore spacing sizes." They also establish notice and hearing procedures for wells utilizing these concepts" and eliminate the limitation
on the number of wellbore completions per quarter section.7 ' From
an environmental standpoint, they extend water well sampling requirements to the entire area7 6 and require operators to file waste
management plans.
In December 2011, the Commission adopted a package of new and
amended regulations to mandate the public disclosure of hydraulic
68. Id. at Introduction.
69. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:318A (LexisNexis 2012).
70. Id.
71. Amendments to CurrentRules of the ColoradoOil and Gas Conservation Commission, 2 CCR 404-1, Amending Rule 318A, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION
COMM'N, 2 (2011), http://cogcc.state.co.us/rr_docs_new/GWA2011/GWA2011State
mentBasisPurpose.pdf.
72. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:318Aa(4)C (LexisNexis 2012).
73. Id. § 404-1:318Aa(4)D.
74. Id. § 404-1:318Ae(6).
75. Id. § 404-1:318Af.
76. Id. § 404-1:318Ae(4).
77. Id. § 404-1:318Ah.
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fracturing fluid chemicals. These new requirements became effective
April 1, 2012, and build upon regulatory amendments adopted in
2008, which required the disclosure of such chemicals to state regulators and health professionals upon demand, and upon the voluntary
public disclosure of such chemicals by certain operators through the
"FracFocus" website."
The centerpiece of the new disclosure regime is Rule 205A. It imposes tiered requirements on chemical vendors, service companies,
and operators-vendors and service companies must provide chemical
disclosure information to operators within thirty days after a hydraulic
fracturing treatment is concluded, and operators must then post this
information on the FracFocus website within sixty days after the treatment is concluded. 9 The information is posted in a standard format
and includes data on the well and the fracturing treatment; information on additives, that is, trade products, may be reported separately
from information on chemicals and concentrations in an attempt to
reduce the need for trade secret claims.80 All chemicals and chemical
concentrations must be disclosed unless they constitute a trade
secret.81
If information is withheld as a trade secret, the trade secret claimant
must submit a new Form 41 to the Commission.8 2 This form provides
contact information for the claimant, justification for the claim, and
certification of the claim's legitimacy.83 Trade secret claims are subject to challenge through the Commission and the courts,8 4 and trade
secret information must still be promptly provided to the Commission
and health professionals under certain circumstances."
As part of the APD process, operators are required to provide surface owners with a standard information sheet on hydraulic fracturing." Operators are also required to provide the Commission with at
least forty-eight hours' notice before a hydraulic fracturing treatment
occurs, and the Commission forwards this information to the local
government. The regulations also provide that the Commission will
develop its own database if the FracFocus website does not become
78. See www.fracfocus.org. The website was developed and is administered by the
Ground Water Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, both of which are interstate organizations of state regulators.
79. 2 COLO. CODE REGs. § 404-1:205A(b)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
80. Id. § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(A).
81. Id. § 404-1:205A(b)(2).
82. Id. § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(C).
83. Form 41: Trade Secret Claim of Entitlement, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM'N (Dec. 2011), http://cogcc.state.co.us/forms/PDF-Forms/Form410531
2012.pdf.
84. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:522(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012); see also COLO.
REv. STAT. § 34-60-114 (2012).
85. § 404-1:205A(b)(5), (d)(2).
86. 2 COLo. CODE REGs. § 404-1:305(e)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2012).
87. 2 CoLo. CODE REGs. § 404-1:316C (LexisNexis 2012).
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searchable by chemical and time period by approximately January
2013." The Commission plans to issue a report in April 2013 on the
frequency of trade secret claims and any issues arising in connection
with such claims.
In February 2012, Governor Hickenlooper created a task force to
identify mechanisms to better coordinate state and local regulation of
oil and gas development to better protect public health and the environment, avoid duplication and conflict, and encourage responsible
development.8 9 The task force's April 18, 2012, report did not recommend any new laws or regulations; instead, it recommended "a collaborative process through which issues can be resolved without litigation
or new legislation."90 To this end, the task force made several recommendations for strengthening the Commission's local government designee program and offered a series of protocols for education and
outreach, inspections, and reporting and response.91 The Commission
subsequently conducted a series of stakeholder meetings during the
spring and summer to discuss the issue of well setbacks. Several
groups have urged modifications to the current setback requirements
set forth in Rule 603, and the Commission initiated rulemaking on this
subject in October of 2012.92
In April 2012, the Commission issued a notice to operators to clarify hydrogen sulfide reporting requirements under Commission Rule
607 and Bureau of Land Management Onshore Order No. 6. The
notice provides detailed guidance on when hydrogen sulfide reporting
and planning are required, what information should be included, and
how certain measurements should be calculated. 94
Effective June 1, 2012, the Commission revised its Form 5A Completed Interval Report to include additional information on the well
completion process.9 5 As revised, the form requires operators to provide information on the total fluid, gas, acid, and proppant used in the
88. Id. § 404-1:205A(b)(3).
89. Colo. Exec. Order No. B 2012-002 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://www.
colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251616203275.
90. Press Release, John Hickenlooper, Governor of Colo., Oil and Gas Task Force
Makes Recommendations Related to State and Local Regulatory Jurisdiction (Apr.
18, 2012), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/
1251621390178.
91. Id.
92. Notice of Rulemaking Hearing, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM'N
(Oct. 15, 2012), http://cogcc.state.co.us/RRIHF2012/setbacks/NoticeRulemakingRE
Setbacksv21_.pdf.
93. Notice to Operators Reporting Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S): Clarificationsfor Implementation of COGCC Rule 607 and BLM Onshore Order No. 6, COLO. OIL & GAS
CONSERVATION COMM'N (Apr. 13, 2012), http://cogcc.state.co.us/RRDocs_new/
Policies/H2SGuidance.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Form SA: Completed Interval Report, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION
COMM'N (June 2012), http://cogcc.state.co.us/forms/PDFForms/Form5A20120705.
pdf.
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treatment, together with the amount of recycled and fresh water utilized.' 6 Information is also required on the volume and disposition of
flowback as well as whether green completion techniques were utilized." Operators must file this information with the Commission
within thirty days after a formation is completed.98
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 2 COLO.

CODE REGS.

§ 404-1:308B (LexisNexis 2012).
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